Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 200) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 588) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 238) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 230) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The commentaries note that the prohibition can be derived from another proof-text (Leviticus 19:13): “Do not hold the wage of a worker overnight.” (See the following halachah.) The repetition of the prohibition points to the severity of the transgression. It is not, however, considered to be a separate negative commandment.

Thus, this is a prohibition that can be corrected by the payment of money. In such an instance, lashes are not given (Hilchot Sanhedrin 18:2). The Chacham Tzvi (Responsum 26) emphasizes that aside from this factor, lashes are given only when one violates a transgression by performing a deed. In this instance, there is no deed involved.

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 339) quotes the Ramah, who maintains that a person who delays his payment of rent for a property does not violate this prohibition.

A gentile who has formally accepted the observance of the seven universal laws commanded to Noah and his descendants. This term is given because such a gentile is allowed to live in Eretz Yisrael. See Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 10:6, Hilchot lssurei Bi'ah 14:7 and Hilchot Melachim, the conclusion of Chapter 8.
The commentaries note that in his Sefer HaMitzvot, the Rambam uses the term “gentile” and not “resident alien.” Some, however, suggest that this was a change made by the censor.

For when Leviticus 19:13 mentions the prohibition against delaying the payment of a worker, it uses the term re’acha, “your colleague,” which is interpreted as referring to a fellow Jew.

Without ever intending to pay him.

Bava Metzia 112a offers two interpretations of the proof-text:
a) by withholding the worker’s wage, it is as if the employer kills him;
b) by withholding the worker’s wage, it is as if he kills his own self.

The Kessef Mishneh emphasizes that a person transgresses these two prohibitions only when he thinks of withholding the worker’s wage entirely. If he plans to pay him, but merely desires to delay, he transgresses only the commandments mentioned in the first halachah. This is also reflected by the Rambam’s wording in Halachah 5.

A worker’s wages are not due until he completes his work (Bava Metzia 83b). Therefore, the employer is given the following portion of the day to pay him his due.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 339:3) states that this applied only in Talmudic times when a worker would work until sunset. Today, it is customary that when a worker completes his work before nightfall, he should be paid that day.

There are some who explain that as long as the owner does not have the benefit of the worker’s activity in his possession, the prohibition does not apply to him. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 339:10 adds another point: the craftsman has the owner’s article in his possession that he can keep as collateral.

Or for that matter, a longer period of time.

The Kessef Mishneh and others question the wording employed by. the Rambam. Seemingly, instead of referring to the verse from Leviticus cited in Halachah 2 (which deals with delaying payment overnight), he should have cited the verse from Deuteronomy (which deals with delaying payment passed nightfall).

This relates to the question discussed in Chapter 10, Halachah 4, whether or not a craftsman acquires a share in the increase in the value of the article he works with. According to the view espoused by the Rambam, that the craftsman does not acquire a share in the article’s increase in value, there is no difference between a craftsman and an ordinary worker. Both are due a wage.
According to the view that a craftsman acquires a share of the increase, the payment to the craftsman is not a wage, but a sale. If the owner takes the article without paying him, it is as if he has borrowed money from the craftsman and owes him a debt. In such an instance, the prohibition against delaying a worker’s wage does not apply. See Sefer Me’irat Einayim 339:12.

Although the employer does not violate the Scriptural prohibition, he does violate the Rabbinic prohibition mentioned in the following verse.

In such an instance, the agent is responsible for the workers’ wages. Hence, he is held culpable for this transgression.

Our translation follows the interpretation the Kessef Mishneh feels is most appropriate. Others interpret this as meaning that the worker must agree to accept payment from the other person. See similar rulings in Hilchot Mechirah 6:9 and Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 16:4.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 339:10) rules that even if the third party does not owe the employer anything, if he accepts the responsibility of paying the worker, his commitment is binding. The Shulchan Aruch also states that this arrangement is dependent on the acceptance of the worker. Even after he agreed to accept payment from the third party, the worker may change his mind and seek payment from the employer.

He may not say: "Since I have already violated these commandments, I will delay payment indefinitely."
Bava Metzia 110b explains that these transgressions are not ongoing. The person is considered to have violated them only once.

Although the directive comes from the Bible, since it does not stem from a verse from the Torah, it does not have the status of a Scriptural commandment.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 89:3) state that in addition to having been hired in the presence of witnesses, the witnesses must also see that the worker actually performed labor on behalf of the employer.

A Torah scroll, or in certain instances tefillin (Hilchot Sh’vuot 11:1).

Had our Sages not instituted this special ordinance in consideration of the worker, the employer would be required to take a sh’vuat hesset if he denied the worker’s oath entirely or a Scriptural oath, if he admitted owing a portion of the debt. Our Sages removed the responsibility of the oath from the employer and placed it on the worker for the reasons explained by Rambam.

See Hilchot Sh’vuot 11:2.

Therefore, he may think that he paid the worker even though he did not. Even if the employer is dealing with only one worker, since he has many responsibilities to deal with, we fear that he may make such an error. [See the Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah (Sh’vuot 7:1).]

The Ra’avad protests this ruling, stating that the oath taken by a minor is never considered a matter of consequence. The Maggid Mishneh supports the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that our Sages felt that the worker should receive his wage and were willing to grant it to him without an oath. The oath was required only to satisfy the feelings of the employer. Hence, even if the worker was a minor, this is acceptable.
It must be emphasized that although the standard published text of the Mishneh Torah follows this version, there are other versions [see Tur (Choshen Mishpat 89); Migdal Oz, Rav Kapach] who maintain the text should read: “Even if the employer is a minor, the worker may take this oath and collect his wage.” The intent is that generally a minor may not be sued for payment of a debt. Nevertheless, in this instance, in consideration of the rights of the worker, our Sages made an exception and gave the worker the right to collect his wage. This interpretation is supported by the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 5:11.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 89:2) follows the latter interpretation. The Ramah (based on the Ra’avad) states that if the worker is a minor, the burden of the oath is placed on the employer.

This depends on the principle of miggo - i.e., if the employer desired to lie, he could have told a more effective lie. Instead of merely denying that he owed the worker his wages, he could have denied hiring him.

Generally, when one witness testifies in support of a plaintiff’s claim, the defendant is obligated to take a Scriptural oath to free himself of liability. In this instance, however, the witness is not supporting the worker’s claim that the employer owes him money - he is merely testifying that he was hired.
The Maggid Mishneh, the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 89:3) cite opinions that maintain that when one witness testifies that the employer hired the worker, the employer must take a Rabbinic oath that resembles a Scriptural oath.

According to the principles stated in Halachah 2.

The rationale is that usually a worker will seek to be paid immediately. If a worker does not seek to be paid, that weakens his argument that he is in fact due money. Moreover, we are loath to suspect that the employer transgressed a Torah prohibition (Bava Metzia 113a,b).

Our translation is close to a literal translation of the Rambam’s words and reflects the ruling of the Ir Shushan, who explains that the worker must continually come and demand his wage. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 89:12, however, states that it is sufficient for him to come when his wage is due and for witnesses to see the employer told him to come back at a later date.

For we assume that he was paid on Tuesday.

Similarly, as long as the worker continues to demand his wage, he is given the right to take an oath to support his claim (Kessef Mishneh).

The rationale is that the employer will remember the amount of money he promised the worker. This is not a fact that his preoccupation with his affairs will cause him to forget (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 89:14).

I.e., he must bring witnesses who testify that the employer hired him at the wage he mentioned.

When a person admits a portion of the claim made by a plaintiff, he is considered a modeh b’miktzat and is required to take a Scriptural oath. This applies, however, only when the debt is outstanding. If the defendant has already paid the portion he admits owing or is ready to pay it immediately - he is considered as having denied the claim made against him entirely. Thus, according to Scriptural law, he is not required to take an oath at all, and even according to Rabbinic Law, he is required to take only a sh’vuat hesset. Nevertheless, in this instance, in consideration of the worker’s feelings, our Sages required the employer to take a more severe oath.
(Note, however, the Siftei Cohen 89:9, who supports the view advanced by certain Rishonim that if the employer does not admit a portion of the worker’s claim, he is required to take only a sh’vuat hesset. The rationale is that generally a Rabbinic oath that requires one to hold a sacred article is taken to expropriate property and not to maintain possession.)

I.e., not only was he not paid, the employer was not required to take a severe oath.

Which is a far more lenient oath.
The rationale for this leniency is that the laws pertaining to this dispute - in which the employer’s position is favored - should certainly not be more stringent that those mentioned in the previous halachah. Since the employer is required only to take a sh’vuat hesset when he denies owing the worker anything in these situations, he is not required to take a more severe oath when there is a question regarding the amount promised (Maggid Mishneh, quoting the Ri MiGash).

This applies in a situation where the garment is not seen. Had the tailor stated that he returned the garment, his word would be accepted. Hence, based on the principle of miggo, we would also accept his word if he claims to have purchased it. This applies even if witnesses observed the garment being given to the tailor (Hilchot To'en V'Nit'an 9:2).
In this halachah, the Rambam takes this logic a step further and gives the tailor the option of taking an oath to support his claim regarding his wage. The rationale is again based on the principle of miggo. We assume that if he wanted to lie and take unfair advantage of the employer, he would have claimed to have purchased the article and kept it as his own.

Had the tailor claimed that he had purchased the article, he would have been required to take only a sh’vuat hesset. Here, he is required to take a more severe oath. The distinction between the two instances can be explained based on the Rambam’s statements in Hilchot Malveh V’Loveh 13:2.
When he is claiming that an article is his own, he is required to take an oath to maintain possession of the article. Hence, a sh’vuat hesset is acceptable. When, by contrast, he is claiming his wage, he seeks to expropriate from another person by virtue of his oath. This is possible only when he takes a severe oath, resembling one required by Scriptural Law. (Note, however, the Siftei Cohen 89:10, who differs with the Rambam and states that only a sh’vuat hesset is required.)

He cannot, however, claim more than the article’s worth, for then the principle of miggo would not apply. For he has no support for his claim to such an amount.

E.g., he has returned it to its owner.

E.g., the garment is visible, in which instance the tailor does not have a miggo to say he returned it (Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an, loc. cit.)..

I.e., witnesses who testify to the veracity of his statements.

But not a more severe oath, as would be required of an employer.

The authorities explain that one can make a distinction between a worker who works for a daily wage and requires that for his livelihood, and a craftsman who contracts out his work and is not as dependent on the immediate payment of his wage.
It must, however, be noted that in Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 9:2, the Rambam writes: “The employer takes an oath while holding a sacred article [because of the craftsman’s claim], as we explained in Hilchot Sechirut.” The Maggid Mishneh suggests that possibly there is a printing error in either this halachah or Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an, or our halachah is talking about an instance when the tailor demanded payment after the time it was due.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 89:5) relies on the Rambam’s ruling in Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an and requires the employer to take an oath while holding a sacred article. The Siftei Cohen 89:11 maintains that a sh’vuat hesset is sufficient.

In contrast to other situations, where a person is encouraged to refrain from taking the oath (see Hilchot Sh’vuot, Chapter 11), no such statements are made to a worker.

See Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 1:12, which explains that once a person is required to take one oath for a colleague, he may be required to include in the oath a denial of any other claim a colleague will make against him. This privilege is not granted with regard to the oaths taken by a worker.
The rationale for both these leniencies is that our Sages felt that if they were not granted, the worker would become intimidated and would refrain from taking the oath.

Since the prohibition against taking a false oath is very severe, it is possible that the worker will have misgivings before taking the oath. Therefore, we reassure him.

Anything less than a p'rutah is not considered significant and cannot be expropriated through legal practice (Maggid Mishneh).

The commentaries note the apparent contradiction between the Rambam’s statements here and those of Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 3:7:
My masters ruled that all those who take oaths and collect their due need not make a claim of two silver [me’in, as is required with regard to oaths required by Scriptural Law]. I, however, differ and maintain that the defendant must deny [at least] two me’in. Only then may the plaintiff take an oath as ordained by the Sages and collect his due.
The Maggid Mishneh explains that either here the Rambam wrote his masters’ ruling without mentioning his own, or he made a distinction between a worker and other claimants, because the worker is dependent on his wage.
The Kessef Mishneh offers some explanation for the Maggid Mishneh’s first interpretation, stating perhaps the intent is that although the Rambam differed with his masters, that difference was theoretical. He was not willing actually to rule against their opinion in an actual court decision. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 89:2) quotes the Rambam’s ruling here. Note the commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch, which offer other resolutions of the apparent contradiction.