Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

For, as stated in Halachah 3, when a person purchases the field, the seller explicitly states that he will make restitution if the property and its increase are expropriated from the purchaser (Bava Metzia 15a).
The Maggid Mishneh states that, according to the Rambam - as evident from the clauses of this halachah - a creditor can expropriate a field’s increase in value only when the borrower extended the lien to property that he would acquire in the future. And as the Rambam states in Chapter 18, Halachah 1, if the borrower does not stipulate that the lender has this right, it is not granted to him.
The Siftei Cohen 115:2,5 differs with the Maggid Mishneh and maintains that the Rambam’s intent is that the increase in the field’s value that comes as a matter of course can be expropriated by the creditor even if the borrower did not make such a stipulation. When, however, the increase in value comes because of the purchaser’s investment, the creditor cannot expropriate the increase in value unless such a stipulation was made. He supports this contention with a comparison to the rights of a firstborn for a double share of his father’s inheritance. The firstborn is not given a double share of property that is ra’ui - i.e., ultimately, it will accrue to the estate, but is not possessed by the estate at present. The ruling is that a firstborn receives a double share of a property’s increase in value when the increase comes about as a matter of course, but not when the increase comes about through investment in the estate.

For had the field remained in the possession of the debtor, this increase also would have taken place (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 115:2).
The Rashba, Rabbenu Zarchiyah HaLevi and many other authorities differ with the Rambam on this issue and maintain that even when the field’s increase in value comes as a matter of course, the purchaser is allowed to retain half. The Tur and the Ramah accept the view of these authorities, while the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 115:1) quotes the Rambam’s view. The Siftei Cohen, loc. cit. defends the Rambam’s ruling on the basis of his earlier ruling. The property is considered as if it belonged to the creditor at the outset, and thus he is entitled to the increase.

Since this increase comes as a direct result of the purchaser’s investment, he is given a share in the increase. Nevertheless, the purchaser receives only half of the increase, because the investment was made on an existing property. The increase was due to the inherent value of that property, and that property was on lien to another creditor. Thus, as the Rambam explains in the later clauses of the halachah, it is considered as if the property is on lien to two creditors and the increase is divided between them.

100 zuz.

Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi quotes - although he does not accept - this view in his commentary on Bava Metzia, Chapter 2. This approach is attributed to Rabbenu Chanan’el.

I.e., first the purchaser should be reimbursed for his expenses as due a squatter, and then in addition, he should be given half of the increase in value above those expenses.

I.e., a squatter is either reimbursed for his expenses or given the increase in the value of the field, whichever is less. For example, if he invests 50 zuz and causes the value of the field to increase 100 zuz, as the Rambam states, he receives 50. If, however, the value would increase only 25, that would be all that he would receive (Hilchot Gezelah 10:4).

In the standard printed texts of the Mishneh Torah, this sentence is placed in brackets, and some commentaries maintain that it should be admitted. It is, however, found in many authoritative manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. Hence, in many contemporary printings it is included without brackets.
The question is whether or not the Rambam accepts this approach. As mentioned, Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi quotes - although he does not accept - this view in his commentary on Bava Metzia, Chapter 2. There are many other authorities who follow Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi’s perspective. Although - in his Bet Yosef, Rav Yosef Karo tries to equate the Rambam’s approach with that of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi - in his Bedek HaBayit, he states that the authentic texts of the Mishneh Torah follow the other version. He therefore accepts that approach and cites it in his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 115:1). See the notes on Halachah 6, which also dwell on the question of whether the Rambam accepts the position of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi or that of the “great Sages.”
The Tur and the Ramah follow Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi’s approach. The Siftei Cohen 115:9-10 explains that this is also the Rambam’s view and explains at length why it should be followed. Among his arguments is that a squatter has no one to turn to but the owner of the land. The purchaser, by contrast, can - and will - turn to the seller and ask him to reimburse him for the entire value - the principal and the increase - of the field expropriated from him.

The Maggid Mishneh asks: If there was property that the debtor sold after he sold the property to Levi, why is Reuven the creditor allowed to expropriate the property from Levi? Levi can tell him: “When I purchased this property I left you a source from which to collect your debt. Expropriate your due from there.”
The Maggid Mishneh offers several possible explanations. Among them is that the other property is in a different country. Hence - although it is on lien to the original debt since taking possession of it involves effort and expense, we do not require the creditor to accept it instead of the property that is immediately available.

When the increase came because of an investment.

When it came as a matter of course.

I.e., according to law, the purchaser would have the right to expropriate property on the basis of such a claim. Nevertheless, in order to maintain the continued flow of commercial dealings, our Sages ordained that neither such a person - nor the others mentioned by the Rambam - have the right to expropriate property on this basis.

This refers to an instance where a thief stole a field full of produce and partook of the produce. We do not allow the owner of the field to expropriate property sold by the thief to recover the value of the produce. All that he can do is expropriate the property in the thief’s possession (Rambam’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Gittin 5:1). [Rashi offers a different explanation of that mishnah. Although the Rambam accepts the law that results from Rashi’s interpretation (see Hilchot Gezelah 9:5), he does not associate it with that particular teaching.]
The Lechem Mishneh questions the logic of the Rambam’s interpretation, for the theft is not a matter of public knowledge. Hence, it should not have any greater power than a loan supported by a verbal commitment alone.

As explained in Hilchot Ishut, Chapter 18, one of the stipulations of the ketubah is that a woman will continue to receive her sustenance from her husband’s estate after his death. And, as explained in Hilchot Ishut (the second half of Chapter 19) another of the stipulations of the ketubah is that the daughters of the deceased will be given their sustenance from his estate. Hilchot Ishut 16:5 states that these obligations should not be paid from the estate’s increase in value.

I.e., there is no way of knowing to what degree a person will increase the value of his property, how much produce the thief will eat, and what will be the sustenance required by the widow or the daughters.
To explain the rationale: When a purchaser acquires a property, he takes into consideration the possibility that since the property is on lien to debts and to other sales, it can be expropriated from him. Nevertheless, since those debts and sales are matters of legal record, the purchaser can estimate the degree of risk involved. With regard to the increase in a property’s value and the other matters mentioned above, since these are not a cut and dry matter, there is no way the purchaser can foresee the extent of his risk.

When establishing the conditions of the financial arrangements between a husband and his wife, our Sages granted the husband certain advantages. This is one of them (Bechorot 52a).

I.e., the increase in the field's value is considered comparable to a property that the borrower/seller acquired after the loan and sale, and it is thus on lien to both the lender and the purchaser.

See Chapter 20, Halachah 1.

I.e., based on the principle that the increase in the field’s value is considered comparable to a property that the borrower/seller acquired after the loan and sale, the following corollary applies.

As mentioned in note I, the Maggid Mishneh uses this clause as proof that the principles stated above apply only when the borrower agreed to such a stipulation.

As mentioned above, the Siftei Cohen 115:9 maintains that the Rambam did not accept the opinion of the “great Sages” and gives the creditor half the field’s increase in value, regardless of the purchaser’s investment. He cites this clause as proof of his position, for here the Rambam does not mention deducting the amount of the investment. The Maggid Mishneh, who maintains that the Rambam accepts the view of the “Sages”, explains that the Rambam is using concise language, and his intent is that after the investment is subtracted, it is worth 300 zuz.

The 150 zuz for which the field was sold.

See Chapter 20, Halachah 4.

First 75 zuz is divided in three portions, so that Shimon receives his entire claim. Then the remaining 75 is divided between Levi and Yehudah.

Similarly, any produce that has been harvested is considered the property of the purchaser. The Siftei Cohen 115:17 explains that the produce that has been harvested is considered to be movable property, and movable property that has been sold is never on lien to a creditor.

I.e., one might assume that since it is considered as if the property is in the possession of the lender from the outset, the purchaser might be required to reimburse him for the benefit he received. Hence, the Rambam states that the fact that he purchased the land gives him at least the benefit of partaking of its produce while it is in his possession.

The commentaries have spoken at length of the apparent contradiction between the Rambam’s ruling here and in Hilchot Sechirut 2:4, on the one hand, and his rulings in Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an 5:4 and Hilchot Mechirah 1:17, on the other hand, in which he equates produce that is ready to be harvested with movable property. The Siftei Cohen 115:18 notes the commentary of the Maggid Mishneh on Hilchot To’en V’Nit’an, which differentiates between serving as a watchman over landed property and other instances. The Siftei Cohen explains that since a watchman does not intend to harvest the crops himself, they are considered to be part of the landed property. Similarly, he explains that the creditor considers the landed property and the produce as a single entity.
The status of crops that are ready to be harvested is a point of controversy among the Rabbinic authorities. The Rambam’s ruling has its source in the Halachot of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi. The Ramban, Rashi and others maintain that if the produce is ready to be harvested, it is considered to be movable property. And the Rashba and Rav Zarchiyah HaLevi maintain that all produce is considered to be movable property in this context. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 115:1) quotes the Rambam’s view. Sefer Me’irat Einayim 115:9 and the Siftei Cohen 115:18-19 mention the other perspectives.

The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 115:3) states that the same laws apply when a person purchases property, and the seller explicitly states that he does not accept financial responsibility if the property is expropriated from him.

For it is as if this increase was given together with the property itself. Rabbenu Ephraim and Rav Zerachyah HaLevi differ and maintain that the creditor may not expropriate any increase in value from the recipient of a present. The Tur and the Ramah (loc. cit.) quote their opinion.

I.e., the giver agrees to reimburse the recipient if one of the giver’s creditors expropriates the field from the recipient.

This law is an obvious consequence of the rationale mentioned by the Rambam at the conclusion of the halachah (Maggid Mishneh).

As described in Halachah 1.

And hence, the seller is bound by this commitment.

For a person generally does not take financial responsibility for a present, and if he does, the commitment must be explicitly stated in the deed of transfer.

For he will not have any way of recovering this loss from the person who gave the present.

Through investment.

The Rambam compares an heir to the recipient of a present, for an heir also has no one to reimburse him for his investment.

The authorities who maintain that a creditor may not expropriate any increase in value from the recipient of a present contend that the same laws also apply with regard to heirs.

I.e., If the field was originally sold for 100 zuz, the purchaser caused its value to increase to 200, and thus when the creditor expropriates 150 (the principal and half of the increase), 50 zuz (114 of the field) remain. The question is: What should be given to the purchaser - the money or the land? The Rambam continues to explain the principles on which that decision should be made.

A kab is 1382 cubic centimeters according to Shi'urei Torah and 2389 cubic centimeters according to the Chazon Ish.

As the Rambam states in Hilchot Shechenim 1:4, a field that is too small to sow nine kabbim of grain in is not large enough to be considered a field, and a garden too small to sow half a kab in it is not large enough to be considered a garden. A garden is generally smaller than a field, and even if it is of a lesser size, it is considered valuable.

The Siftei Cohen 115:23 states that the Rambam’s wording is not precise. The intent is that the land should be divided between them.

Before quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 115:2) quotes the Tur’s ruling that - unless the debtor/seller designated the field an ipotiki - the purchaser has the option of paying the debt owed the creditor and preventing him from expropriating the field. (See Chapter 18, Halachah 8.) This makes it evident that this law applies only “[when] a creditor expropriates [property]”- i.e., in a situation where the purchaser gives him this option. Nevertheless, even though the creditor expropriates the field, if the amount due the purchaser is large enough, the creditor must give a portion of the field to the purchaser.

The commentaries question whether the purchaser can demand a portion of the land even though on the surface, it would not be worthwhile for him to do so. The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 115:2) state that the purchaser is given the option and may take the land if he so desires. There are those who maintain that the Rambam also shares this view.

I.e., the debtor/owner told the creditor: “Derive payment from this.” See Chapter 18, Halachah 3.

I.e., in contrast to the ordinary situation described in the previous halachah, in this instance, even if the portion of the field due the purchaser because of the field’s increase in value is large enough to be considered a field, it is not given to the purchaser. Instead, he is given money.
The purchaser is placed at a disadvantage, because it was stated in the promissory note that the field was designated an ipotiki, and thus the matter is considered to be public knowledge. The purchaser must be aware of the risk involved and take the fact that the field may be expropriated from him into consideration when purchasing it.

As mentioned in Hilchot Gezelah 10:4, a squatter is either reimbursed for his expenses or given the increase in the value of the field, whichever is less. See the following halachah.

This wording appears to indicate that the Rambam accepts the opinion of the “great Sages” mentioned in Halachah 1, who maintain that ordinarily the investment is deducted before the field’s increase in value is calculated. In this instance, however, the creditor’s position is strengthened, because the field was designated an ipotiki. Therefore, he is required to reimburse the purchaser only for the investment he made.

Together with the principal.

We have interpreted the Rambam’s rulings according to the commentary of the Merkevet HaMishneh, which maintains that the Rambam subscribes to the opinion of the “great Sages.” The Ra’avad, by contrast, understands the Rambam as following the approach of Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, and hence raises questions with regard to this halachah, asking why the purchaser receives payment for both the investment and the field’s increase in value. (It must, however, be noted that the Maggid Mishneh understands the Rambam as following the approach of the “great Sages,” but nevertheless sustains the Ra’avad’ s objections to this halachah.)
The Shulchan Aruch does not mention this law at all. The Tur [and his perspective is quoted by the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 115:3)] maintains that if the field was designated an ipotiki, a creditor can expropriate the entire field together with its increase in value, even if the original debt was only for the value of the principal. In such a situation, the purchaser is reimbursed for his expenses by the creditor, and for the increase in value by the seller/debtor. If, however, his expenses exceeded the field’s increase, the creditor is required to reimburse him only for the field’s increase in value, so that he loses the remainder.

The purchaser thus loses the difference between his expenses and the field’s increase in value.

And hence, the creditor is not entitled to that increase in value, as the Rambam states in Halachah 4.

Bava Metzia 110b states that the creditor claims: “Your father caused the property to increase in value.” The word “perhaps” is the Rambam’s addition, teaching that these principles apply even when the creditor is not able to issue a definite claim.

And hence, he may expropriate the increase.

If the heirs do not prove their claim, the creditor is allowed to expropriate the property’s increase in value.
The Lechem Mishneh and the Siftei Cohen 115:33 explain that this ruling applies even when the field was not designated an ipotiki. Since the field is on lien to the creditor, it is considered as having been in the creditor’s possession, and the heirs are considered as seeking to take the increase in value from him. Hence, following the principle: “When a person desires to expropriate property from a colleague, the burden of proof is on him,” the heirs are required to prove their claim. The Tur and the Ramah differ and maintain that when the field was not designated an ipotiki, the creditor is required to prove his claim.

They cannot demand a portion of the land.
The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 115:6, as interpreted by Sefer Me’irat Einayim 115:23) state that this applies when the debt was not equal to the principal and the increase in value. If, however, it is equal to that amount, the field can be expropriated from the heirs, and the purchaser is required to reimburse them only for their expenses. The Siftei Cohen 115:36 offers a different interpretation.

He is required to accept the money, for as explained in the notes on Chapter 18, Halachah 8, since the creditor paid money, he cannot demand anything but money to be given him in return.

As stated in Halachah 4, the heirs are entitled to the entire increase in the value of the property brought about by their investment. If, however, the property increases in value as a matter of course, the Rambam maintains that the creditor is entitled to the increase.